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Diversity Levers
DAN L. BURK*
Patent law is capable of prompting innovation across a wide range of technologies
by virtue of flexible “policy levers” that allow patent standards to be calibrated to the
impediments that characterize different economic sectors. But it has become increasingly
clear that social bias also raises significant barriers to successful creativity and
innovation. In this article, I argue that the same policy levers used to address economic
impediments to innovation can also be used to address other social impediments to
innovation. I offer as a detailed example one doctrinal response to the well-documented
gender gap in patentable innovation. I conclude by suggesting that such doctrinal
“diversity levers” are available to address innovation deficits among other
underrepresented innovators, but that considerable work remains to identify when and
where such intervention might be effective.
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property, particularly in the form of patents or copyrights, is
generally understood as providing a means of legal appropriability: encouraging
beneficial new creations by securing the value of investments in such creations.1
Because the exclusive rights conferred by a patent or copyright deter
unauthorized copying or misappropriation of creative work, these intellectual
property regimes are believed to foster innovations that might otherwise be
under-produced. However, it is increasingly clear that in many instances,
creative production is deterred by social rather than economic impediments. A
growing body of scholarship indicates that social biases may erect unexpected
and underappreciated barriers to the goals of intellectual property systems.
Indeed, intellectual property laws themselves might inadvertently deter the
creative activity of certain creators, such as women or racial minorities, and may
skew new innovation away from disadvantaged communities that most
desperately need its benefits.
In this article, I explore how existing features of intellectual property law
might be deployed to address such impediments to innovation. In previous
work, I have discussed certain doctrinal features of patent law, dubbed “policy
levers,” that allow the patent system to be modulated to match the innovation
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1. See Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Principles, 8 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 403 (2012) (summarizing the economic justification for intellectual property);
see also David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration,
Licensing, and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986) (outlining costs and benefits of various strategies
for appropriating returns to innovation investment).
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incentives needed in different economic sectors.2 Here, I argue that the same
mechanisms may be used to address social impediments to innovation. While
such “diversity levers” might be used to correct a variety of social failures in the
patent system, in this article I will focus my discussion on the pervasive deficit of
patenting among women who are engaged in technical research. A substantial
and growing body of empirical literature demonstrates that women patent and
commercialize new inventions at only a fraction of the rate of similarly situated
men, indicating a serious failure in the effectiveness of patent law’s innovation
incentive.3 I offer as an illustration as to how patents might be calibrated to
address this failure the example of a particular policy lever that modulates patent
law’s non-obviousness requirement. I conclude with some thoughts on how
other features of the statute might be used to address similar social impediments
deterring full participation in the innovation system.
I.

PATENTS FOR HUMANITY

In 2013, the Obama Administration implemented an experimental program
through the United States Patent Office, dubbed “Patents for Humanity.”4 The
program, now in its second year, was implemented to encourage innovation in
the service of economically impoverished and under-served populations. The
“Patents for Humanity” program is structured as a competition in which
companies that hold patents for life-saving or critical infrastructure technologies
are publicly lauded for deploying such patents in the broader public interest,
especially in the service of disadvantaged or developing populations. Such
award-winning activities have included development and distribution of
malarial drugs; development of high-protein, vitamin-enhanced sorghum; and
development and distribution of water purification packets, all targeted toward
developing nations.5
This program’s recognition of humanitarian patent activity is not simply
honorary, but includes a sort of patent prize: Patent holders who receive these
awards are granted a special certificate that allows them to accelerate
examination of a subsequent patent through the United States Patent Office. In
essence, this is a type of prize for innovative activity that is particularly
meritorious along a particular dimension— that of humanitarian relief.6 These
certificates might become even more valuable under legislation recently
introduced by Senators Patrick Leahy and Chris Coons that would make such
acceleration certificates transferable, essentially creating a secondary market in
2. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575
(2003).
3. See infra notes 29–46 and accompanying text.
4. See Patents for Humanity, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents/init_events/patents_for_humanity.jsp (last visited Dec. 21, 2015).
5. Id.
6. In this sense the program constitutes a modest experiment toward engaging robust debate
over whether prizes might serve as a substitute, or perhaps a supplement, to the exclusivity regime of
patent law. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 303 (2013); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Benjamin
N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999 (2014); Steven
Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001).
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such certificates.7
This initiative is intriguing for a variety of reasons, but particularly for what
it suggests about the purposes and policy of patent law. Certainly the “Patents
for Humanity” initiative is laudable simply as an effort to deploy innovation to
improve human welfare. But the initiative also marks another, more important,
and possibly less apparent milestone. The White House program and the
accompanying Leahy-Coons bill are striking in their recognition that some types
of patentable innovation are more desirable than others, not necessarily due to
the economic value that can be realized from the innovation, but because the
innovation serves particular social goals such as alleviating suffering, improving
health, or enhancing human flourishing. To be sure, at some level each of these
social benefits may ultimately produce measurable economic benefits, but
recipients of the White House award are presumably not donating their
intellectual property to impoverished communities in anticipation of a better
monetary return on their investment, and the beneficiaries of the donation are
likely to benefit from such donations in ways entirely out of proportion to the
value of an accelerated prosecution certificate.
Additionally, the program implicitly recognizes that some types of socially
valuable innovation may only occur when innovators are nudged or oriented in
a particular direction. The “Patents for Humanity” program offers such
orientation by means of a modest administrative subsidy coupled with what is
likely a more valuable reputational reward. Of course, the underlying patent is
already a type of subsidy—it entails state-sponsored and legally enforceable
exclusivity intended to allow the holder to reap profits that would be unavailable
in a competitive market. But it is not a direct subsidy, and depends upon an
otherwise functioning market to license the patent or to sell products embodying
the claimed technology. Innovation aimed at impoverished or underdeveloped
communities may not be properly facilitated by this type of incentive; by
definition, an impoverished or disadvantaged population has less money to
spend and perhaps cannot afford the innovation at any price, let alone the
inflated prices allowed under a patent. Sometimes sales of an innovation in
wealthier regions can cross-subsidize lower prices for the innovation in
impoverished regions, but this strategy may be unavailable where clean water or
plentiful food supplies, or robust public health measures are already available in
the wealthy regions—the population that needs the innovation cannot afford it,
and the population that can afford it does not need it.
Hence, the extra incentive of a publicly recognized award helps to cure a
particular type of market failure. Again, the patent system itself is most often
described as a remedy to pervasive market failure; the typical justification for
patents holds that unaided market incentives will not tend to prompt inventions
with the characteristics of public goods because once such goods are produced
they will be costlessly appropriated by others besides the innovator who made
the investment to produce them.8 But to the extent that patents address a market
failure, it is typically perceived only as a market failure of this particular kind—

7. Patents for Humanity Program Improvement Act of 2012, S. 3652, 112th Cong. (2d Sess.
2012).
8. See Burk, supra note 1 at 402–03.
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specifically, the problem of recouping an investment in easily appropriated
public goods. As it stands, the patent system is not necessarily calibrated to
counter other types of market failures that may stifle creative production, nor is
it necessarily calibrated to the problem of providing public goods in situations of
impoverishment, when the problem of undersupply is more extensive or
pervasive than usually contemplated.
“Patents for Humanity” approaches these issues by providing an add-on
incentive to the grant of a patent. But the problems addressed by this add-on are
not themselves add-ons; they are integral considerations to the goals of
intellectual property, and there seems no reason that the exclusive rights
provided under either patent or copyright must themselves be oriented only
toward curing the public goods problem. In the United States, the federal
intellectual property regimes of patent and copyright are governed by the
constitutional requirement that they “promote the progress of science and the
useful arts.”9 Such progress has typically been conceptualized in terms of the
economic value of innovation prompted by a patent or copyright: the exclusivity
of a patent or copyright is expected to allow patent holders to restrict output of
the patented item for a limited term, inflating profits from that item to ensure a
return on investments made in new creative enterprises, thus making such
investments more attractive. The assumption inherent in such a rationale is that
more innovation is better, so that facilitating more innovation constitutes
progress.
But there is no particular limitation explicit in the constitutional text or
concept of progress that constrains it to an advancement of economic value, or to
prompting ever more capacious levels of creative output.10 Progress might be
imbued with different meaning; it might equally well indicate wider
dissemination of knowledge,11 or it might indicate the generation of works that
are aesthetically more pleasing.12 Perhaps it could indicate the creation of works
that are less environmentally burdensome13 or more socially just.14 Even within a
conventional utilitarian framework, an increase in non-monetary benefits such as
happiness or dignity might represent progress in social welfare, as more people
would consider themselves better off. But the concept of progress need not be
9. U.S. CONST, art. I, §8, cl. 8.
10. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993) (questioning the conventional economic understanding of “progress” in the
Constitution); see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000)
(questioning whether neo-classical economics offers a neutral understanding of intellectual property
“progress”).
11. Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress" in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001).
12. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998); John
Tehranian, Dangerous Undertakings: Sacred Texts and Copyright's Myth of Aesthetic Neutrality, in THE
SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 418 (Matthew David & Debora Halbert, eds., 2014).
13. See, e.g., Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193 (1991); Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with
Intellectual Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51
(2005); Andrew Torrance, Patent Law, HIPPO, and the Biodiversity Crisis, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 624 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 831, 918
(2011).
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confined to utility and might plausibly encompass incommensurables such as
human flourishing or dignity.
II. BIAS IN PATENT LAW
Suggesting that the proper metric for constitutional progress might not be
solely utilitarian or economic may elicit some protest that intellectual property
law is merely a mechanism for promoting creativity, and was not intended as the
vehicle for promoting goals such as equity or social justice. And yet it should be
clear from the outset that intellectual property law already promotes certain
social outcomes with respect to social status, privileges, and opportunities,
whether those outcomes are intended or not. Certainly intellectual property
cannot be entirely value neutral; it is specifically intended to promote particular
social activity at the expense of other social activity. Patentable innovation is
rewarded by exclusivity at the expense of curtailed access to the claimed
invention, and possibly at the expense of non-patentable innovation, as resources
are channeled toward projects that qualify for patenting.15 It should not be
surprising if re-allocation of such resources has disparate or unequal effects.
But recent scholarship has increasingly recognized that intellectual property
regimes are not value-neutral with respect to other social goods such as justice
and diversity.16 To some degree, this should also not be surprising; intellectual
property is a product of its social milieu, and to the extent that society is
generally biased to one degree or another by assumptions about race, class,
gender, or other socially constructed norms, those assumptions might be
expected to seep into the formulation of intellectual property.
What may be surprising to some observers is that values not intended or
explicitly contemplated in the formulation of intellectual property law become
implicated in its execution. Unlike areas of the law such as family law or voting
law or employment law, where issues of social bias are an integral consideration
to the goals of the law, and so are pervasively considered in its formulation and
application, intellectual property might be thought of by many observers as
socially neutral. The goals and structure of intellectual property law are not
generally thought of as being associated with race, gender, or other historically
disadvantaged social classifications.
And yet on closer examination, what seems ostensibly neutral may hold
hidden biases. Recent scholarship examining race-specific drug patenting
illustrates such unwitting social bias. Such issues became apparent during the
controversy over BiDil, a combination of two existing pharmaceuticals, a
vasodilator and a hypertensive compound, which were the subject of a process

15. See Burk, supra note 1, at 402–03 (2012) (discussing social costs of exclusive rights in
intellectual goods).
16. See, e.g., Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for Copyright Law,
15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207 (2007); Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual
Property, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender,
and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273 (2007); Burk, supra note 14; Laura A
Foster, Situating Feminism, Patent Law, and the Public Domain, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 262 (2011).
Kara Swanson, Getting a Grip on the Corset: Gender, Sexuality, and Patent Law, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
57 (2011).
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patent for use to treat congestive heart failure.17 Both pharmaceuticals were well
known in the art, and their combination to treat congestive heart failure was
considered unpatentably obvious by the Patent Office. The patent was allowed,
however, after the applicant pointed out that treatment data for the combination
showed unexpectedly good results among African-American patients, and
amended the claims of the patent to restrict its scope to a method of treating
hypertension in that population.18
The BiDil patent is troubling in part because the exclusive rights in the
invention are framed in terms of a racial label—“African-American” or
equivalent terms—designating social constructs rather than scientific
classifications.19 Individuals with a wide range of physical and genetic
characteristics might identify or be socially classified as “African-American.”20
But Jonathan Kahn has pointed out that the claims of this patent additionally
serve to expose certain troubling features of current patent doctrine.21 In
particular, the determination of patentable non-obviousness for the treatment
incorporates a troubling racial assumption. Patents are only granted to
inventions that represent a significant advance over the technology that is
already available; the legal metric for assessing such a level of invention is to
determine whether the claimed invention, taken as a whole, would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the patent application
was filed.22
Kahn aptly observes that the BiDil combination of drugs could only be
judged inventive, or non-obvious, if the baseline for judging obviousness is the
effect of the drugs in the majority Caucasian population.23 An enhanced effect in
the African-American population is only unexpected or surprising if that
population is somehow considered to be outside the norm. Not only is there no
genetic or physiological basis for the social classification, the patent assumes that
the classification constitutes something aberrant. By examining the framing of
the obviousness inquiry, it becomes clear that the legal requirement for nonobviousness intersected with a social classification to set a racial baseline for
patentability.
Thus, the patent is in some sense premised upon the
marginalization or “othering” of the African-American social grouping.
Patent law may similarly incorporate social biases against other
marginalized classes. In previous work, I have pointed out several dimensions
of the U.S. patent statute that intersect with the social construction of gender to
produce unexpected, aberrant, and largely unappreciated outcomes.24 For

17. See Howard Brody & Linda M. Hunt, BiDil: Assessing a Race-Based Pharmaceutical, 4 ANN.
FAM. MED. 556 (2006).
18. Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography of Intellectual
Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 353, 379–81 (2006).
19. See Brody & Hunt, supra note 17, at 557.
20. Nonetheless, there is a long history of racial and ethnic terminology in U.S. patents. See
Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV.
409 (2008).
21. Kahn, supra note 18.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2015).
23. Kahn, supra note 18, at 403.
24. See Burk, supra note 14.
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example, the metrics by which the statutory criteria for a patent are measured
entail a very particular mode of thinking about invention, assuming that it occurs
by means of certain analytical and rational processes.25 However, both anecdotal
and empirical evidence suggest that women in Western cultures have been
socialized to approach problem solving differently than their male counterparts,
and that they function with different cognitive parameters in a different
professional and interpersonal milieu.26 Inventive methods that might be labeled
“intuitive” or “emotive” are more typically associated with and performed by
those society assigns to the female gender.27 There is no reason to think that such
approaches necessarily produce less useful or less valuable innovation than
methods labeled “rational” or “analytical,” and both likely play a role in
technical creativity. But the latter approaches are more easily codified and
documented than the former,28 so they are more amenable to satisfaction of the
teaching and disclosure requirements of patent law as currently formulated.
III. THE PATENT GENDER GAP
Such concerns over the epistemology of the patent statute may seem largely
speculative or theoretical. And yet a substantial and growing body of empirical
evidence demonstrates gendered outcomes associated with patents. Although
social and epistemic explanations of this evidence remain elusive, the descriptive
empirics of gender in the patent system are relatively straightforward: women
are at every level pervasively absent from the patent system. In the United
States, far fewer patent attorneys and patent agents are women than are men.29
Female inventors account for a relatively small proportion of patent applications,
even when counted as co-inventors as part of an inventive team.30 This female
deficit holds true at every career stage and has remained persistent over time,
with only small recent increases in female inventorship.31 This discrepancy in
inventorship is not limited to the United States; a number of studies indicate that
25. See id.at 891–92; see also Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 192–94 (2007) (discussing patent law’s elevation of mental effort over
physical effort).
26. The most classic, influential, but controversial formulation of this proposition remains
CAROL GILLIAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
27. See Burk, supra note 14, at 904–05.
28. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1009
(2008) (discussing codification requirements in patent doctrine); see also Peter Lee, Transcending the
Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF.
L. REV. 1503 (2012) (noting the inability of patents to transmit uncodified or tacit knowledge).
29. See Annette I. Kahler, Examining Exclusion in Woman-Inventor Patenting: A Comparison of
Educational Trends and Patent Data in the Era of Computer Engineer Barbie, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 733, 792 (2011); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Gender Diversity in the Patent Bar, 14 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (2014).
30. Jennifer Hunt et al., Why Are Women Underrepresented Amongst Patentees?, 42 RES. POL’Y 831,
831 (2013).
31. See id. One recent commercially commissioned study found a very large uptick in recent
female inventorship. See NATIONAL WOMEN’S BUSINESS COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS (2012). This finding is sufficiently far out of line with other studies that
experts in the field have questioned the data collection and analysis. See Karen A. Frenkel, The
Reporting Gap on the Patent Gender Gap, ACM NEWS (May 30, 2013), http://cacm.acm.org/news/
164776- the-reporting-gap-on-the-patent-gender-gap/fulltext (quoting critiques of the study).
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it is found consistently across multiple jurisdictions.32
As a general matter it is well known that, despite some progress toward
gender parity, women continue to enter science and engineering fields in
substantially smaller numbers than men.33 The failure to attract women into
science and engineering fields undoubtedly contributes to the smaller total
number of patents involving women. But the gender gap in patenting can only
partially be explained by the lower number of women entering patent-intensive
sectors involving engineering or the physical sciences.34 Even taking into
account the absolute number of male and female patentees in such fields, those
women who do work in these areas acquire patents at a lower rate than their
male counterparts.35 This does not appear to have changed over time despite
growing numbers of women entering these fields.36
Additionally, certain technical sectors, notably biotechnology, are known
for attracting a higher number of female researchers, but studies of women who
work in biotechnology show that they still patent at a fraction of the rate of
similarly situated men.37 This is true both for academic and industrial
researchers, although the gap is more pronounced in the former field.38 The
patents that women do acquire in these areas appear to be of equal or greater
significance as those acquired by male scientists and engineers.39 But women
who obtain patents are less likely to commercialize them via licensing or product
development than their male counterparts.40 As in other technical areas, this has
remained true for successive generations of female scientists over decades,
despite an increase of women entering the life sciences.41

32. See, e.g., Ranier Frietsch et al., Gender Specific Patterns in Patenting and Publishing, 38 RES.
POL’Y 590 (2009) (surveying European Patent Office gender data from 14 countries).
33. See DAVID N. BEEDE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, WOMEN IN STEM: A GENDER GAP TO
INNOVATION, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION ISSUE BRIEF NO. 04-11 (2011). Because a
science or engineering background is required to practice before the USPTO, the smaller numbers of
women holding science and engineering degrees certainly helps explain why women are
underrepresented among patent agents and patent attorneys.
34. Hunt et al., supra note 30, at 840–42.
35. Id. at 834.
36. Id.
37. See Waverly W. Ding et al., Gender Differences in Patenting in the Academic Life Sciences, 313 SCI.
665 (2006); Kjersten Bunker Whittington & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Women Inventors in Context: Disparities
in Patenting Across Academia and Industry, 22 GEN. & SOC’Y 194 (2008) [hereinafter Whittington &
Smith-Doerr, Women Inventors]; Kjersten Bunker Whittington & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Gender and
Commercial Science: Women’s Patenting in the Life Sciences, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 355 (2005) [hereinafter
Whittington & Smith-Doerr, Gender and Commercial Science]; G. Steven McMillan, Gender Differences in
Patenting Activity: An Examination of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry, 80 SCIENTOMETRICS 683 (2009).
38. Whittington & Smith-Doerr, Gender and Commercial Science, supra note 37, at 360; Whittington
& Smith-Doerr, Women Inventors, supra note 37, at 207.
39. Whittington & Smith-Doerr, Gender and Commercial Science, supra note 37, at 364–365; Ding,
Murray, & Stuart, supra note 37, at 666; McMillan, supra note 37, at 690.
40. See Paula E. Stephan & Asmaa El-Gainainy, The Entrepreneurial Puzzle: Explaining the Gender
Gap, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 475 (2007).
41. Whittington & Smith-Doerr, Gender and Commercial Science, supra note 37, at 358, 360; see
generally Ding et al., supra note 37.
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This gap in innovation is economically significant, representing by one
estimate a loss of 2.7% U.S. GDP per capita.42 While it is difficult to account for
the deficit in female patenting, ethnographic work has begun to suggest some of
the underlying reasons. The causes of the patent gender gap are likely complex,
arising from an intricate milieu of deeply-seated social factors.43 Women may
have been socialized to take fewer risks, to push their projects less aggressively,
and to think about commercialization of their work less often than their male
counterparts.44 Venture capitalists and other start-up funding sources that might
support invention development may take female innovators less seriously, and
view their inventions less favorably than they would the inventions produced by
similarly situated men.45 Women may be either intentionally or inadvertently
excluded from opportunities and institutions, such as advisory boards or
business consultancies, that would facilitate opportunities for innovation, and
women may otherwise lack the social connections that are often vital to
innovation development.46
Thus, it is clear that there are severe impediments to female participation in
the patent system, and every indication is that social biases and historic
subordination serve to create such innovation barriers. And here the parallel to
earlier work on modulating the patent statute to accommodate industry-specific
innovation profiles is striking. Much as the firms in some economic sectors,
innovating in particular technological environments, will experience the patent
system in a radically different way than firms in other environments, so a wealth
of data indicates that female inventors will experience the patent system in a
radically different way than an otherwise similarly situated male counterpart.
The female inventor is more likely to face disapproval and resistance to securing
a patent, and is less likely to have access to the expertise and resources necessary
to bring an innovation to fruition.
Of course, the particular obstacles faced by the female inventor could be
addressed by means of add-on incentives along the lines of “Patents for
Humanity.” We might provide special prizes or reduced application fees for
female patent applicants, or provide subsidized loans or specialized grants to
finance innovation by female inventors.47 And such programs may well be
desirable for any number of reasons; just as the gender disparity problem likely
stems from the interaction of a variety of innovation deterrents, so overcoming
the problem will likely require a suite of ameliorative efforts. But the barriers
before female innovators appear in large measure to be barriers to product
development and commercialization. These are precisely the kind of
impediments to innovation that the patent system itself is intended to address,
42. See Jennifer Hunt et al., Why Don’t Women Patent? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 17888, 2012).
43. See Fiona Murray & Leigh Graham, Buying Science and Selling Science: Gender Differences in the
Market for Commercial Science, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 657, 660 (2007).
44. Id.at 483; Stephan & El-Gainainy, supra note 40, at 479–80.
45. See Stephan & El-Gainainy, supra note 40, at 481.
46. Id.; Ding, Murray, & Stuart, supra note 37, at 666–67.
47. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Non-Patent Innovation
Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing alternate incentive mechanisms for
innovation).
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although the conventional supposition is that these impediments will arise due
to systematic economic factors rather than systematic cultural or social factors.
Whatever the source of the impediments, the existing statutory system includes
at least some tools, or policy levers, to combat them.
IV. POLICY LEVERS
The general concept of policy levers in intellectual property is now well
established, and has become a fixture in the analysis of the patent system.48 In
previous work with Mark Lemley, I have argued that the patent statute can and
indeed must incorporate “policy levers”—that is, doctrinal standards that are
mutable and responsive to the characteristics of new technologies, new
industries, and even the changed circumstances of existing industries.49
Different technologies have different commercialization profiles; industries
based on those technologies face different innovation challenges. For example,
although creating new candidate molecules in pharmaceutical research is fairly
simple, characterizing, testing, and securing regulatory approval for new drugs
is an enormously expensive undertaking. By contrast, developing a new
software product, although technically complex, is orders of magnitude less
expensive.50 A very substantial incentive is needed to prompt the investment of
hundreds of millions of dollars in a new drug; a much smaller incentive, or
perhaps no incentive at all, is needed to prompt the necessary investment to
produce new software.
Thus, providing the necessary patent incentive to commercialization
necessarily varies with the challenges faced by a particular industry. It is
impossible to foresee what challenges an industry may face. Some technologies
will be nascent, emerging, or entirely unknown when a statute is formulated,
meaning that the legislature cannot have the information necessary to specifically
provide incentives for the innovation configuration of industries based on those
technologies. Consequently, the patent statute must be equipped to allow
ongoing modulation of the level of reward available to meet the needs of
different economic contexts. Lemley and I argued that our current patent statute
contains such provisions, which we term “policy levers,” and that courts are
particularly well positioned to employ such levers.51 Different statutory
48. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property
Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics
of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2001); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1747 (2011); Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of
Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229 (2014). The concept has also experienced an uptake in other
areas of legal analysis. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353 (2003) (international banking law); Seth L. Cooper, Seeing Competition,
Eyeing Regulation: FCC Wireless Policy Following the Wireless Report, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 41
(2011) (telecommunications law); Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 440 (2009) (tax); Alex Rice Kerr, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, 34 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 69
(2010) (environmental law).
49. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT
(2009); Burk & Lemley, supra note 2; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law TechnologySpecific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2003).
50. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 49 at 39–40.
51. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2.
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provisions within the patent statute provide differing tailoring tools to vary the
scope, quantity, or characteristics of patents by industry.
To take only one example of such a provision, out of many possible levers:
as mentioned previously, to qualify for a patent, an invention must be deemed
“non-obvious,” that is, it must comport with a requirement set out in section 103
of the patent statute.52 Section 103 provides that a patentable invention cannot
have been obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the art”—sometimes
abbreviated to the acronym PHOSITA—when taken as a whole, at the time a
patent application was filed.53 The statute specifies considering the context of a
particular technology or “art” in deciding whether to award a patent. Thus,
applying this provision requires tailoring the legal standard to specific
technologies; what is obvious to a person of ordinary skill in one art may not be
the same as what would be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in a
different art.
Indeed, the levels of ordinary skill in different arts will vary according to
specific circumstances over the lifetime of the particular field. In order to satisfy
the statutory standard, courts reviewing patents, and the United States Patent
Office issuing patents, will have to inquire into the characteristics surrounding
specific technologies to know what would be obvious in each of them.54
Developments in technologies in which innovation is easier will be more likely to
be obvious, and so those areas will receive fewer and narrower patents, which is
the proper outcome from a policy standpoint, since less incentive is needed there.
Developments in technologies in which innovation is more difficult will be more
likely to be judged non-obvious, so that those fields receive more and broader
patents, which is the correct policy outcome, as more incentive is needed to
overcome the obstacles faced by innovators in those fields.
Such flexible standards allow decision makers to tailor a unitary statute that
would otherwise be “one size fits all” to meet the needs of diverse industries.55
In the previous published work on such policy levers, our major concern was the
calibration of economic patent incentives to the innovation profiles of various
industries, so as to offer the proper reward to innovators.56 But there is no divine
decree or law of nature that mandates patent incentives must be solely calibrated
to optimize the benefit of the system to innovation producers. This is purely a
choice of social policy. As the White House “Patents for Humanity” initiative
suggests, it is entirely possible to calibrate the patent system according to the
needs of innovation consumers. This possibility has been largely overlooked,
probably in large measure because of the assumption that once an incentive is
available to overcome barriers to investment in what is essentially a public good,
competitive market forces will prompt the production of output that meets the
needs of consumers.
As I have already noted, the “Patents for Humanity” program, together
with the Leahy-Coons bill, implicitly recognizes both that, without intervention,

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2015).
Id.
See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 49, at 109.
See id.
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market failures or other impediments will keep certain beneficial innovation
from occurring, and that patent incentives can and sometimes should be nudged
in a direction that benefits particular classes of consumers.57 Such nudges might
be accomplished through an external program such as the added rewards of
“Patents for Humanity.” But such add-on incentives may not be necessary. If
the patent system is already loaded with policy levers, these might be employed
to the same ends as an add-on program, without the need to devise new
incentives. The necessary tools may already be available in the statute. Patents
could be calibrated to address more than one type of market failure.
I have observed in other work that the patent system comprises a
networked ecology of constituent communities.58 Patent doctrine could be
attuned to address failure in any of them. One could, for example, calibrate
various policy levers in the patent statute to optimize the system for the benefit
of the courts or the Patent Office.59 (Indeed, one might sometimes worry that
exactly this has happened, perhaps without the sanction of the legislature.) It is
unclear that optimizing the system for the benefit of judges or bureaucrats would
be desirable as a general policy, although certain aspects of the system probably
ought to be tailored for administrative efficiency. Similarly, one might adjust
various policy levers to optimize the system for the benefit of patent attorneys
and other advocates. Again, it is unclear that this would be sensible as an overall
goal, although certain aspects of patent doctrine such as inequitable conduct
should likely take into account the role of an inventor’s representative or
advocate.60
To achieve the goals of “Patents for Humanity,” doctrinal policy levers
might be calibrated to increase the likelihood of a patent, or increase the
magnitude of a patent reward, where the innovation in question might offer
particular benefit to impoverished or economically disadvantaged populations.
The availability of the patent might, for example, allow price discrimination
between wealthy and less wealthy populations, allowing the former to subsidize
the latter.61 To take the example of the PHOSITA obviousness lever, policy
analysis of the obviousness standard in patent law has long recognized that this
lever plays a critical role in responding to the degree of uncertainty that attends
innovative activity, and particularly in fostering the chancy development of
newly discovered technologies.62
Decisional models of the obviousness standard indicate that the patent
system should reward the innovator who develops a new invention when it is
more likely than not that an invention will not succeed.63 The riskier an
innovation is, the less likely it is to succeed; the less likely it is to succeed, the
larger the incentive needs to be to prompt investment. Non-obvious inventions
are risky inventions, and receive a patent reward when successful. Typically the
57. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
58. See Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reymann, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus, 26 L. & LIT. 163 (2014)
59. See id. at 185–86.
60. See, e.g., Therasense Inc. v. Becton-Dickinson, Inc., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (setting
standards for inequitable conduct before the Patent Office).
61. SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVE 37 (2004).
62. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1992).
63. Id. (sketching a decisional model for obviousness determination).
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risk taken is a technological risk, but innovation also entails regulatory or
financial risks.64 Such risks could well include innovation where the return on
investment will likely be impeded by the poverty of the most likely consumers of
the innovation, but where the inchoate social benefit of the invention would
nonetheless exceed the private cost of development. The PHOSITA who
succeeds in developing beneficial technology in the face of such an impediment
could be said to have a non-obvious invention.
V. DEPLOYING DIVERSITY LEVERS
The same rationale holds for failures of the patent system to engage the
innovative capacity of traditionally marginalized groups. Just as the patent
system incorporates certain assumptions that may restrict the type of innovation
available to impoverished populations, it also appears to incorporate
assumptions that limit the innovation produced by female innovators. Evidence
of the sort I have detailed above, demonstrating the dramatic failure of the patent
system to engage women, suggests as an initial matter that “progress,” under
pretty much any socially plausible definition of that term, is being impeded. But
such evidence also suggests ways in which the existing levers in the patent
stature might be deployed to begin addressing the gender patenting gap.
Taking once again my example of the Section 103 PHOSITA policy lever, we
can draw a clear parallel to the deployment of the obviousness standard across
industrial sectors.
It is clear that the PHOSITA working on software
development is quite different than the PHOSITA working in biotechnology.65
But by the same token, the woman of ordinary skill in biotechnology experiences
innovation and patenting very differently from her male counterpart.
Statistically, she is significantly less likely to develop discoveries into
innovations, and is far less likely to seek a patent for patentable innovations.66
The result is an effective shift in the contextual standard for non-obviousness;
where the male biotechnology innovator will recognize and develop an
innovation, the female biotechnology innovator, hampered by social and cultural
impediments, may not. The corollary is that innovation by women in
biotechnology is in turn significantly more likely to be extraordinary—that is,
innovation in this context, against heightened odds, is more likely to constitute
non-obvious innovation.
Recognizing this difference within the PHOSITA standard could mean that
innovation by women should be more amenable to patentability in at least one
respect. As described above, the obviousness standard is generally seen as a
lever that increases the incentives for success in the face of uncertain innovation
outcomes, essentially rewarding risk-taking.67 Here I simply point out the
gendered context of such an uncertainty assessment under the standard. The
uncertainty of success is assessed from the point of view of the person having
ordinary skill in the art, but that uncertainty is higher for a woman of ordinary
skill. We know that female innovators are far less likely to develop a promising
64.
65.
66.
67.

BURK & LEMLEY supra note 49, at 39.
Id. at 63–64.
See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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technology, meaning that the ostensibly neutral obviousness standard
incorporates a de facto gendered assumption about risk-taking.68 Recognizing
that the woman of ordinary skill faces a gender gap avoids the assumption that
the PHOSITA makes a masculine uncertainty assessment and assists in
overcoming the impediments faced by female innovators.
Indeed, the Supreme Court opened the door to this type of inquiry in its
landmark 2007 opinion on patent obviousness, KSR v. Teleflex.69 The United
States patent statute says that obviousness must be judged against the
understanding of a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent technology, but,
as a practical matter this means that the adjudicator of obviousness must have
some evidence of what the PHOSITA would know. A court, or the Patent Office,
like any decisional forum, must have a record in the form of documents, or
testimony, or other evidence of the relevant facts in order to make its
obviousness judgment.70 Prior to the KSR decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all patent cases, had required very explicit documentary evidence of an
invention’s obviousness in order to deem it unpatentable.71 The result was of
course that many patents were issued because documentary evidence was
lacking, rather than because the invention was a real advance over prior
technology.
In KSR, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit’s standard was too
rigid for the realities of actual product development.72 In assessing obviousness,
the Court held that the standard must take into account unwritten “design
incentives and other market forces” that may prompt the PHOSITA to make
changes to existing technology in predictable and evident fashion.73 The opinion
similarly counsels that the standard incorporates the unwritten “inferences and
creative steps” ordinarily available to the PHOSITA as a matter of “common
sense,” even if those considerations are not explicit in the literature.74 Thus, the
KSR opinion specifically contemplates taking into consideration the social and
economic context in which the PHOSITA works. Sometimes, the PHOSITA’s
surroundings will facilitate the ability to envision the claimed invention, making
the invention more obvious. Presumably the PHOSITA could likewise face
contrary design incentives, market forces, and influences that could impede his
ability to formulate the claimed invention, making the invention less obvious.
It is a small step from taking into account the design incentives, market
pressure, and similar ambient influences on the PHOSITA, to similarly take into
account the challenges the PHOSITA might face in devising and developing new
inventions under pervasively adverse social conditions. Risk, success, and
certainty are all socially determined perceptions. Aspects of such perceptions are
in fact taken into account in the obviousness “secondary factors” articulated by

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
KSR Int’l Co. v Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
See Burk, supra note 28, at 1030.
550 U.S. at 418–19.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 420.
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the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere.75 In Graham and its companion
opinion, United States v. Adams,76 the Court held that inventive success in the face
of contrary teachings, against the advice and expertise offered by others of skill
in the art, is strong evidence of non-obviousness.77 Stated differently, an
inventor who succeeds in innovating in the face of pervasive contrary social
pressure, lack of funding and commercialization opportunities, and sparse
encouragement or financial support, is more likely to have a non-obvious
invention.
VI. THE WOMAN OF ORDINARY SKILL
The Section 103 policy lever thus provides an example of a patent metric
that can be tailored to circumstance, including the impediments to innovation
that might be considered under a standard of innovation appropriate to the
woman of ordinary skill in the art. Of course, in this particular instance, taking
such contextual obstacles into account pushes the obviousness standard in the
opposite direction from the ambient influences considered by the Supreme Court
in KSR; they could make an invention less likely, rather than more likely, to be
obvious. But not all “diversity levers” will necessarily increase the availability or
frequency of patenting in targeted circumstances. Some levers, responding to
social impediments in innovation, may decrease the availability of patents.
Patents are believed to offer incentives that on the whole benefit progress, but
those incentives come at a cost. It is entirely possible that certain social goals
might be furthered by restricting, rather than augmenting the availability of
patents in targeted fields.
This approach may seem to fragment the PHOSITA standard, potentially
changing a general objective metric into a series of narrowly specialized
assessments. Complete particularization of the standard would of course shift
the objective standard into a subjective standard, taking into account the
individualized circumstances of innovation, yielding an actual knowledge metric
measuring innovation according to the actual circumstances and abilities of a
particular inventor. But this is not a call for a subjective standard; the PHOSITA
standard already contains multitudes.
The PHOSITA facing high-cost
pharmaceutical development is not the PHOSITA facing Silicon Valley garage
software coding. And as Mark Lemley and I have pointed out, circumstantial
application of patent policy levers will inevitably result in discrete industry- or
technology-specific metrics.78 This effect is a version of Carol Rose’s famous
observation that no legal imperative is composed entirely of bright-line rules or
of completely malleable standards; rather, law typically processes between the
two.79 Fact-sensitive standards will sometimes encounter repeated patterns of
circumstance, and where this occurs, a rule-based expectation will coalesce
around the common fact pattern. Such elaboration of particularized applications
within a general standard is a normal and sensible development in the law.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
Graham, 383 U.S at 17–18; Adams, 383 U.S. at 52.
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 49 at 110.
Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
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Thus, parallels to a discrete “woman of ordinary skill” standard already
exist in other areas of law that employ legal constructs conceptually related to
the PHOSITA. Commentators have long observed that patent law’s PHOSITA is
in some sense a close relative of the “reasonably prudent person” found in
Anglo-American tort law;80 both are personified fictional images that define legal
criteria.81
Like the PHOSITA, the reasonably prudent person embodies
contextually and factually specific application of a legal rubric.82 The reasonably
prudent person is intended to articulate an objective standard of behavior
incorporating the particular circumstances of the actor. But of course this means
that courts have over time developed a limited set of variants on the reasonably
prudent person where particular circumstances favored a standard that was
routinely different than that calibrated to the general population.
One such variant on the reasonably prudent person, the reasonable child,
assesses proper caution within the limited ability appropriate to a child under
the circumstances.83 Another variant, the reasonable professional standard, is
calibrated to the proper degree of caution that might be expected given the
ability of a professional, such as a physician or attorney, who has an
extraordinary degree of expertise.84 And, for purposes of the statutorily created
tort of sexual harassment, some courts have developed and applied a specialized
reasonable woman standard for determining when conduct should be viewed as
offensive or damaging.85 The similar development of a particularized objective
standard within the PHOSITA construct would thus not be unusual where a
personified legal standard is used to specify policy outcomes.
An alternate concern might be that modulating the standard in this fashion
could contribute to the problem at issue; that fashioning a separate “woman of
ordinary skill” metric might seem to denigrate the abilities of female inventors
by defining a PHOSITA that is less able to discern the claimed invention.86 But
such concern is largely misguided. First, the PHOSITA is a legal metric,
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). The reasonable person also appears in various
other branches of law, such as criminal law. See Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual
Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2010) (discussing the
different areas of the law utilizing the reasonable person standard).
81. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co. 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (comparing
the PHOSITA to the “reasonable man” in tort law).
82. See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report on the
“Odious Creature,” 23 OKLA. L. REV. 410, 426–27 (1970).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965).
84. See id. § 299A; see also id. § 289(b) (stating that superior training or attributes possessed by an
actor are to be taken into account in determining reasonableness).
85. See e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d
128, 137–38 (1st Cir. 2002); Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 116 (3d Cir. 1999); Torres
v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997). The possibility of a reasonable woman standard for the
general law of negligence has additionally been the subject of extended commentary. See Naomi R.
Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1991); see also MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN
EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD (2003) (arguing that characteristics such
as gender, race, and class should appropriately be incorporated into the reasonable person standard).
86. Versions of this objection have long been recognized as a concern in other areas where a
reasonable woman standard might apply. See Cahn, supra note 85, at 1415; Lucinda M. Finley, A Break
in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 64 (1989).
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calibrated to achieve a particular legal result, which takes into account, among
other factors, the skill and training of inventors in a given technical field. Neither
the familiar generalized PHOSITA standard nor the proposed woman of
ordinary skill standard indicates the actual capability of any particular inventor
or group of inventors.
Additionally, such concerns offer no valid reason to avoid correcting the
gender gap, any more than similar concerns would be a reason to avoid
correcting gender issues such as harassment. There is nothing demeaning about
adjusting a legal standard to cure socially imposed imbalance. Just as an
employment environment of sexual innuendo and “horseplay” will look very
different to a reasonable man than it will to a reasonable woman given the
history and circumstances of harassment in society, so too may the environment
of assertion and self-promotion surrounding commercial innovation look very
different to the reasonable man than it does to the reasonable woman. Women
need prove neither that they are tough enough to endure harassment, nor that
they are aggressive enough to personally overcome the innovation gender gap.
Indeed, even within patent law as it currently exists, the PHOSITA is not a
monolithic concept, but shifts character depending upon the purpose to which
the standard is oriented. The PHOSITA appears at a variety of junctures in
patent law; the patent statute references the standard not only in Section 103, but
again in Section 112.87 Section 112 requires the applicant for a patent to disclose
the invention in sufficient detail to allow the person of ordinary skill to make and
to use it.88 But previous commentators have noted that the PHOSITA of the
Section 103 obviousness standard is not necessarily the PHOSITA of the Section
112 enablement standard.89 The Section 103 obviousness PHOSITA appears to be
more creative, more of a thinker, and more of a risk-taker than his 112
counterpart.90 The 112 PHOSITA indeed seems to be a bit of a dullard, more
conservative and pedestrian in his approach to the prior art.91 This difference
makes sense, as the two constructs take into account the purposes of their
respective policy levers.
This division also reminds us that adjusting the PHOSITA standard for
some purposes need not mean adjusting it for all purposes. The PHOSITA in
Section 112 is engaged in following the teachings of the patent; the 112 PHOSITA
embodies the standard for disclosure of the invention in the patent document.92
The empirical literature I have referenced does not suggest that the woman of
ordinary skill has any less knowledge or ability than her male counterpart. In
fact, evidence shows quite the contrary—the contributions of women who do
engage in innovation are comparable in quality to that produced by men.93 Thus,
there is no reason to think that the woman of ordinary skill would have any
87. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2015).
88. Id.
89. John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA - The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37, 52–53 (1991).
90. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Grout, 377
F.2d 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
91. Tresansky, supra note 89, at 54.
92. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 49, at 146–47.
93. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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particular difficulty reading and following the teachings of a patent beyond
whatever difficulty the conventional PHOSITA might have. Only if there were
reasons to think that some gendering of patent disclosure dictated a more
detailed disclosure requirement would it be necessary to adjust the 112
PHOSITA standard.
CONCLUSION
Patent law, like many other seemingly neutral areas of law, entails social
biases that become apparent only on close examination. I have focused here on
the use of policy levers to address systematic gender bias in the patent system,
and have primarily explored the use of a single lever, the Section 103
obviousness PHOSITA, in that regard. I have focused here on gender in large
measure because there already exists a fairly robust literature devoted to
investigating the gender gap in innovation. The existence of the gap is therefore
well documented and characterized, and we are beginning to understand its
origins. This type of information is critical to guide the application of policy
levers to resolve diversity issues, and the Section 103 PHOSITA standard offers a
clear example of how a particular diversity lever might operate against such a
background.
There are of course many other policy levers in the patent statute, and some
of them may also prove to be useful in addressing aspects of the patent gender
imbalance. Additionally, as I hope I have made clear throughout this article,
gender does not define the only form of bias that may impede progress in science
and the useful arts. My argument regarding diversity levers is likely salient for
other social biases, such as those associated with race. There is for example a
nascent literature investigating African-American innovators, which indicates a
deficit in patenting among that social classification.94 As the dimensions of this
and similar problems become clearer, some diversity levers may be useful in
correcting them.
Finally, I am well aware that I have adopted here a rather modest, “first
wave” position regarding diversity and the patent system. I have largely
assumed that, even within its own utilitarian paradigm, the patent system is
failing in its stated goal to promote innovation if certain classes of innovators are
either wittingly or unwittingly hindered from participation on grounds that are
arbitrary vis-a-vis the goals of the system. I have similarly assumed that, so long
as we have a system that confers certain societal benefits and advantages,
women, impoverished communities, or other under-represented groups who
wish to participate in the system would be better off if they were not arbitrarily
excluded. One could of course question whether we ought to have a patent
system at all,95 or, if we have one, whether it should not have radically different
94. See Lisa D. Cook & Chaleampong Kongcharoen, The Idea Gap in Pink and Black (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16331, 2010) (exploring similar patenting deficits among
female and African-American inventors); see also Lisa D. Cook, Violence and Economic Activity: Evidence
from African-American Patents 1870-1940, 19 J. Econ. Growth 221 (2014) (finding linkage between
declining African-American patenting activity and racial violence).
95. See Immaculada di Melo-Martín, Patenting and the Gender Gap: Should Women Be Encouraged to
Patent More?, 19 SCI. & ENG. ETHICS 491 (2013) (questioning whether enhanced participation in
patenting would be socially desirable).
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goals than those commonly assumed.96 But that is a more controversial
conversation for the future; even without a radical re-thinking of the patent
system there is already copious evidence for deploying diversity levers to
achieve the commonly accepted goals of intellectual property.

96. See Burk, supra note 14, at 918 (suggesting plausible alternative objectives for the patent
system).

